Contactless payment systems are composed of credit and debit cards, key fobs, smart cards, or other devices, including smartphones and other mobile devices that use radio-frequency identification (RFID) or near-field communication (NFC, implemented in Samsung Pay, Apple Pay, Google Pay, Fitbit Pay, or any bank mobile application that supports contactless) for making secure payments.
Contactless credit cards offer a convenient and secure way to make payments without the need to physically insert or swipe the card. But what happens if a threat can disable these payments in the PoS terminal and force you to insert the card?
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Digitalization brings increased cybersecurity risks with it. If a corporation is to secure the loyalty of its customers and partners, it must ensure business continuity and robust protection of its critical assets, corporate data and the entire IT infrastructure to counter growing threats. Large businesses and government organizations often employ multilevel security, but even that is not a guarantee against compromise. Therefore, timely, adequate incident response and investigation are essential to both remedying the consequences and fixing the root cause, as well as to preventing similar incidents from happening again.
Privacy experts are eagerly giving advice on how to secure your accounts and minimize your digital footprint. However, living a convenient modern life comes with a cost to privacy, whether you like it or not: for example, ordering food deliveries or using a ride-hailing service will generate, at the very least, sensitive geodata. And as the data leaves your device, you have little control over it, and it is up to the company to store it securely. However, we see that due to misconfigurations, hacker attacks and malicious insiders, data might leak and appear for sale on the dark web or even on the open web for everyone to see.
LDAP extended operations are additional LDAP operations not included in the original standard list. For example, the Cancel Extended Operation works like an abandon operation, but finishes with a response from the server after the cancel is complete. The StartTLS Extended Operation allows a client to connect to a server on an unsecure port, but then starts Transport Layer Security negotiations to protect communications.
As ACIs are stored on entries in the directory, you can furthermore update access controls while the service is running, and even delegate that control to client applications. DS software combines the strengths of ACIs with separate administrative privileges to help you secure access to directory data.
When DS command-line tools connect securely to a server, the server presents its digital certificate. The tool must then determine whether to trust the server certificate and continue negotiating the secure connection, or not to trust the server certificate and drop the connection.
This section shows how to prepare the server to use a file-based keystore to manage the keys essential to secure communications. For more information about the keys, see "About Certificates, Private Keys, and Secret Keys" in the Security Guide.
A client that sets up a secure connection with a server must be able to trust the server certificate. A server that uses mutual authentication (checking the client certificate) must be able to trust the client certificate. In either case, this involves finding the signing certificate in a keystore or a truststore.
In some cases, DS servers act as clients of external services. For example, REST to LDAP can resolve OAuth 2.0 tokens by sending secure requests to an authorization server. The server can also connect to another LDAP server when using pass-through authentication.
The following steps demonstrate using the keytool command to add a client application's binary format, self-signed certificate to a new truststore for the DS server. This procedure enables the DS server to recognize a self-signed client application certificate when negotiating a secure connection. To allow a client application to perform an LDAP bind using its certificate, see "Authenticating Client Applications With a Certificate" in the Developer's Guide instead.
When you install the DS server, you can choose to configure secure connections and either generate a key pair with a self-signed certificate, or import your own keystore. The default PKCS#12 keystore is /path/to/opendj/config/keystore, and the self-signed public key certificate has the alias server-cert. The password for the keystore and the private key is stored in cleartext in the file /path/to/opendj/config/keystore.pin.
StartTLS negotiations start on the unsecure LDAP port, and then protect communication with the client. You can configure StartTLS when setting up a server, or later using the dsconfig command.
An LDAP connection handler configured to use LDAPS (LDAP/SSL) allows only secure connections from client applications. You can configure LDAPS when setting up a server, or later using the dsconfig command.
When a server and client negotiate a secure connection, they negotiate use of a common protocol and cipher suite. If they cannot negotiate a common protocol and cipher suite, they will fail to set up a secure connection.
The default support is backward-compatible with old clients, meaning that if you do nothing it is possible for a client to use a protocol version that is known to have vulnerabilities, or to negotiate an insecure or very weakly secure connection. To avoid this, limit the protocols and cipher suites that you allow.
This section clarifies the roles that client applications' X.509 digital certificates play in establishing secure connections and in authenticating the client as a directory user. Be aware that establishing a secure connection happens before the server handles the LDAP or HTTP requests that the client sends over the secure connection. Establishing a secure connection is handled separately from authenticating a client as a directory user, even though both processes can involve the client's certificate.
When a client and a server negotiate a secure connection over LDAPS or HTTPS, or over LDAP using the StartTLS operation, they can use public key cryptography to authenticate each other. The server, client, or both present certificates to each other. By default, DS LDAPS and HTTPS connection handlers are configured to present the server certificate, and to consider the client certificate optional. The connection handler property ssl-client-auth-policy makes the latter behavior configurable. For the DSML and REST to LDAP gateways, HTTPS negotiation is handled by the web application container where the gateway runs. See the web application container documentation for details on configuring how the container handles the client certificate.
One step toward establishing a secure connection involves validating the certificate that was presented by the other party. Part of this is trusting the certificate. The certificate identifies the client or server and the CA certificate used to sign the client or server certificate. The validating party checks that the other party corresponds to the one identified by the certificate, and checks that the signature can be trusted. If the signature is valid, and the CA certificate used to sign the certificate can be trusted, then the certificate can be trusted. This part of the validation process is also described briefly in "How Keys are Used" in the Security Guide.
In both cases, the CA who signed the certificate acts as the OCSP responder or publishes the CRLs. When establishing a secure connection with a client application, the server relies on the CA for OCSP and CRLs. This is the case even when the DS server is the repository for the CRLs.
Again, despite being a repository for CRLs, the DS directory service does not use the CRLs directly when checking a client certificate. Instead, when negotiating a secure connection, the server depends on the JVM security configuration. The JVM configuration governs whether validation uses OCSP, CRLs, or both. As described in the Java PKI Programmer's Guide under Support for the CRL Distribution Points Extension, and Appendix C: On-Line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Support, the JVM relies on system properties that define whether to use the CRL distribution points defined in certificates, and how to handle OCSP requests. These system properties can be set system-wide in $JAVA_HOME/lib/security/java.security ($JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/java.security for JDK 8). The JVM handles revocation checking without the DS server's involvement.
The example that follows demonstrates a server configured for tests (insecure connections) to request OAuth 2.0 token information from AM. It uses settings as listed in "Settings for OAuth 2.0 Example With AM".
Optional parameter indicating the truststore used to verify certificates when using secure connections. If you want to connect using LDAPS or StartTLS, and do not want the gateway blindly to trust all certificates, then you must set up a truststore. Not used by default.
The following example creates a policy with a minimum security strength factor of 128, effectively allowing only secure connections for requests targeting data in dc=example,dc=com. A security strength factor defines the key strength for DIGEST-MD5, GSSAPI, SSL, and TLS:
Keep server clocks synchronized for your topology. You can use ntpd, for example. Keeping server clocks synchronized helps prevent issues with secure connections and with replication itself. Keeping server clocks synchronized also makes it easier to compare timestamps from multiple servers.
DS server configuration tools securely connect to administration ports. Administrative connections are short-lived. When configuring replication or reading replication status, a single dsreplication command can connect to multiple servers.
Password storage schemes, described in "Password Storage Scheme" in the Configuration Reference, encode new passwords and store the encoded version. When a client application authenticates with the password, the server encodes the cleartext password using the configured storage scheme, and checks whether the result matches the encoded value stored by the server. If the encoded version is appropriately secure, it is difficult to guess the cleartext password from its encoded value. 2ff7e9595c
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